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The Good as Unity: Its Role in the Good Life
in Plato's Later Thought
Cynthia Hampton 
Assistant Professor of Philosophy 
Ohio University
In the sixth book of the Republic. Socrates begins leading his 
interlocutors down the 'longer road' that leads to the Form of 
the Good which is to complete the earlier account of virtue given 
in Book IV. The end of this road in the Republic is reached via 
the sketch of the Good portrayed in the famous Sun, Line, and 
Cave passages. In this paper, I wish to suggest that the road 
does not, in fact, end here, but extends to the account of the 
Good offered in one of Plato's latest dialogues, the Phi lebus . 
This account, like the one in the Repub lie before it, has 
ontological, epistemological and ethical dimensions, but in this 
paper, I shall concentrate on those aspects that have special 
relevance to the nature of the good life. Specifically, I shall 
focus my discussion on the role the Good as unity plays in the 
good life.
My argument shall run as follows. In the Republ1c . the Good's 
role is ambiguous since its unity is depicted in two different 
ways: as an organic whole of interrelated parts or aspects, and
as an absolute and transcendent One. Corresponding to each of 
these models of the Good's unity is a different picture of the 
good life. According to the first model, we should seek to 
integrate the diversity of our experience, but according to the 
second, we should strive to minimize or even eliminate all 
diversity. In the Philebus. it becomes clearer that the second 
model of unity is the one we should take as our ideal. Thus the 
good life is one in which various types of knowledge and pleasure 
are properly arranged in imitation of the universal order 
provided by the Forms. The Philebus. then, presents us with a 
fuller understanding of how we are to use the Good as the pattern 
for our lives.
Let us first consider a few crucial features of the account 
given in the Republic. In Book VI (at 504A-506E), Socrates 
discusses why the Good is the highest form of study, and then 
proposes to give his own opinion of what the Good is like by 
comparing it to its offspring, the sun. During this discussion, 
which functions as a sort of prologue to the Sun, Line and Cave, 
Socrates makes a number of claims about why the study of the Good 
is essential. One crucial point is that an account of the
virtues without the Good lacks precision and completeness because 
it is in relation to the Good that just actions and other things 
become beneficial. Thus the knowledge of anything else is of no 
help if we do not know the Good (505A-B). The ultimate goal of 
study for the philosopher - rulers must be the Good itself since it 
is by ' looking' to it as a model that they are able to order 
their own souls, the polis and its citizens properly (540B; see
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also 484D; 500D-E, and 506A-B). The use of the Good as a model 
of order suggests that the Good is unity in some sense. If so, 
then we can understand better why the Good is the ultimate goal 
of desire which everyone should strive to acquire (505D). For in 
order to experience the true value of anything, one must be aware 
of its proper place within the whole of reality for which the 
Good is the model.
But how is the Good the model for all of reality in general, 
and for human life in particular? To give a definitive answer to 
this question is well beyond the scope of this paper and, 
perhaps, not fruitful to pursue in detail. After all, Socrates 
in the Republic (and also in the Philebus) warns us that he can 
provide only an outline of the Good. Still, we must have some 
idea of what its general contours are like in order to use it to 
guide our lives. It seems to me that one crucial feature of the 
Good is its unity. The unity of the Good is depicted in two 
different ways in the Republic. One is that the Good encompasses 
the World of the Forms and orders them, as it were, within 
itself. The Forms, in turn, are responsible for the basic 
structure of the sensible world. The other model of the Good is 
that of an absolute simple, and transcendent One. Corresponding 
to these two models are different pictures of the good life. 
According to the first model, those who aspire to pattern 
themselves after the Good will be concerned with ordering the 
different aspects of their lives so as to reflect the ideal order
of the Intelligible World as much as possible. In the rightly
ordered or virtuous life, the diversity of one's experience is 
not reduced but integrated to form an organic whole. According 
to the other model, imitation of the Good will require a
reduction or even an elimination of diversity, a merging of all 
aspects of life into one. The best life is that of contemplation 
the pursuit of mystical union with the One.
The Republic contains passages that can be used to support
either of these views of the Good. Indeed, one could say that 
the first model is the one Aristotle developed into his ideal of 
the life of practical virtue,  ^ while the second model is the one 
that evolved into Neoplatonism. Let us briefly review the 
passages that give rise to each of these models of the Good.
Plato suggests in several places in the Republic that the Good 
is the unity of distinct but interrelated Forms. On the 
ontological level, Plato says that Forms combine with each other 
(476A) and that the Good presides over the Intelligible World 
yet is still a part of it, as the sun is part of the sensible 
world. It is reasonable to assume that the Good unifies the 
Forms by being present to them, not by being a transcendent One. 
The Sun Analogy also suggests that the Good has at least one 
aspect, Truth, which it emanates as the sun does its light (507D- 
508E).
The idea that unity among interrelated parts, rather than 
absolute simplicity, is Plato's ideal is most evident in the 
tripartite division of the State and soul. In both cases, 
oneness is achieved through the unity of distinct but
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interrelated parts. Justice requires that each part retains its 
separate function while temperance insures that the parts will be 
in accord through their consent to be governed by reason (442D- 
443E) . In short, the goal is the harmonious blending of
distinguishable notes (443C-E) not the reduction of all into one 
monotonous hum.
We can find other evidence, however, that the Good stands 
in sharp contrast with plurality. As far as the ontological 
dimension of the Good is concerned, there is no clear indication 
that the other Forms are aspects of the Good. In fact, the 
reference in the Republic to the communion of the Forms is just 
that--a passing reference. Most of the time what is stressed is 
the unitary nature of a Form compared to the multiplicity of its 
sensible instances. So, one would expect the Good to be the most 
unitary entity of all. Socrates, in fact, explicitly states that 
Truth, along with knowledge, is . "Good-1 ike " but not the Good 
itself, which is beyond even Being in dignity and power (509A-B). 
Such language suggests the absolute transcendence of the Good.^
Plato seems to endorse uniformity, and not just unity, as the 
ideal for the good life in many famous (and perhaps, infamous) 
passages. After all, a pluralistic society where the conflicting 
interests of different ethnic and religious groups within the 
State are resolved with peaceful compromises could be said to be 
unified, especially where citizens owe allegiance to the greater 
community as well as to smaller groups. But the minimization of 
conflict, or even its absence, is not the ultimate goal for 
Plato.^ He regards conflict as bad only insofar as he sees it as 
a threat to the organic oneness of the State with which citizens 
are to identify, seeing themselves as members of a single body 
(562B-D). Such complete identification with the State is crucial 
for the upper tier of society; hence Plato's proposals for the 
abolition of private families and property for the guardians. 
But even the artisans are to find their primary source of 
identity in the work that they do for the commonweal. Thus Plato 
says of a carpenter who has contracted a chronic disease that he 
will no longer wish to live if he can no longer contribute to 
society (406D-407A).  ^ Such passages make it clear that even when 
the diversity of human nature requires some division of labor, 
the ultimate goal is oneness with the State. Differences are 
tolerated but only as means to the end of oneness^. In this 
sense, the different occupations are like the alternative paths 
in Hinduism; one chooses the marga that best suits one's 
temperament but what really matters is the common goal: 
liberation from the wheel of life and death.^
Similar passages occur in Plato's discussion of the soul. The 
nature of that exemplary human being, the philosopher, he 
describes as follows:
In one whose passions flow towards knowledge and all that kind 
of thing, they would concentrate, I think, upon the pleasures of 
the mind alone and by itself, and he would give up the pleasures 
of the body, if he is a true philosopher and does not merely 
pretend to-be one (485E)®.
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Because of passages like this one, Plato has sometimes been 
accused of reducing the human being to pure reason^ and the good 
life to one of "fanatical single-mindedness."^®
Although it would be foolish to pretend that Plato presents in 
the Philebus an account of the good as unity which is completely 
free of the ambiguities found in the Republic . a much clearer 
picture does emerge in this later dialogue. *· I shall suggest 
that the Good in the Philebus is a unity of its different parts 
or aspects. The ideal of the good life is one in which various 
types of knowledge and pleasure are properly arranged in
imitation of the universal order provided by the Forms. This
last point is an important one, for the Philebus retains the 
notion that we can only realize our human good by shaping our 
lives so that they are true to the universal Good which unites 
all things. Thus the starting-point of his ethics differs from 
that of Aristotle, as Aristotle himself observed.^ The Good in 
Plato's later thought is neither Aristotelian nor Neoplatonic. 
Surprisingly enough , Plato remains , to the end, a pla.torilst .
First consider the ontological dimension of the Good in the 
Philebus . In both the beginning and the end of the dialogue , 
Plato depicts the Good as a one which is not a completely
transcendent simple, but rather is a unified whole which
manifests itself in distinct but related aspects. Early on, the 
Good is described as an ungenerated and imperishable unit (monad) 
which is both one and many (12C-16A). In order to understand how 
the Good, or any other unit, is both one and many, Socrates 
introduces what he calls the Divine Method. This method is 
grounded on the assumption that all existent entities are from 
one and many and have inherent: within them limit (peras) and
indefiniteness (ape ira) . The practitioners of this method assume 
that there is one Form ^  (or unit) for everything, and then look 
for it. They then look for the two, etc. according to whatever
type of Form is being examined. Each original unity (form) must
be seen not simply as being composed of one and many and 
indefiniteness, but how many it is (i.e. how many parts or 
aspects it has ) must be made clear. Only at this point may each 
unity be allowed to pass unhindered into the indefinite. That 
is, one may acknowledge that the unit or Form has sensible 
instances which are infinite in number and indefinite in aspect. 
The key is to concentrate not on the indefinite many but on the 
intermediate many, the aspects of the one.
The illustrations used to clarify this method are linguistic 
and musical sound. In the case of learning to pronounce the
letters of the alphabet, for example, one realizes that although
the sounds that can be vocalized are infinite, the rules of 
grammar which determine the number and nature of distinguishable 
linguistic sounds--vowels, semi-vowels, mutes --make linguistic 
sound one comprehensive unit.^  One cannot learn to pronoun the 
letters in isolation from one another, but must do so by 
combining them. Thus the role of grammar is crucial in that it 
reveals the proper ways to unite the letters (18B-D).
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[Presumably, letters form syllables, then nouns and verbs, then 
sentences. Cf. Cratvlus 424D-425A.] The essence of the Divine 
Method, then, is to identify the intermediate aspects of the unit 
and how they are related to each other, to the unit, and to the 
infinite sensible instances.
Whatever the mechanics involved in actually plying the Divine 
Method, its aim is clear enough: to understand both the unit and
infinitely diverse sensible phenomena by recognizing those parts 
or aspects which lie between them. This important point
suggests that the goal of knowledge is neither contemplation of 
the absolute One nor the experience of infinite variety, but the 
articulation of unity as it is expressed in multiplicity. That 
Plato uses linguistic and musical sound as his illustrations of 
the Divine Method is no accident, for such examples depict the 
basic structure of reality as an organic whole rather than a mere 
aggregate of individuals. Parts are not discrete units but
elements that blend together like sounds that form spoken
syllables or musical scales. [Cf. Theatetus 203E-204A where
Socrates explicitly claims that the syllable is a single entity 
with a character of its own different from the letters that make 
it up; it is an example of a whole which is different from the 
aggregate of its parts.] Plato's use of auditory examples also 
presents an alternative to the model of knowledge which relies on 
the analogies of sight and/or touch. Such a model is prevalent 
in the Republic and other middle d i a l o g u e s . T h e  visual/tac tile 
model suggests that the soul directly encounters the Forms as 
the eyes or hand must be in the immediate presence of the
sensible in order to see or grasp its properties. Such a model 
suggests that the ultimate objects of knowledge, the Forms, are 
absolute simples with no parts: they can be seen all at once or
grasped in their entirety. But the auditory model suggested by 
spoken and musical sound emphasizes the interconnections of the 
Forms which must be articulated as a system in order to be 
understood.
Even the story told about the origins of the Divine Method 
emphasizes the point that in the Philebus what is important is 
how the different ontological levels are related. According to 
Socrates, the Divine Method was "thrown down by the gods in a 
blaze of light from some Prometheus" (16C5-6). The fire the
mythical Titan stole from the gods to give to humankind 
symbolizes the enlightenment which helps us rise out of the 
condition described by Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound as "a
dreamlike feebleness by which the race of man is held in bondage" 
(11. 549-550). Note how much these words sound like Plato's
depiction of the prisoners in the Cave! In the Republic. though, 
what is 'divine' and 'blessed' is simply the contemplation of the
Good alone, not the bringing of this vision back down into the
Cave (517B-519E). In the Philebus . however, the method that 
provides the link of the one to the many--of the gods to humans-- 
is said to be divine. Our participation in the divine is seen 
in terms of our ability to identify the presence of the one 
within the many. Earlier, Socrates had noted that the one and
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the many are perennially present in all our logoi. reasoning and 
discourse (15D). Our task is to become aware of this presence 
and to embody it in our lives^ .
At the end of the Philebus . Plato reveals that through the 
agency of certain aspects of the Good (i.e. Proportion, Beauty, 
and Truth) the good life becomes possible for us. True to the 
general emphasis on interrelations in this dialogue, Socrates and 
Protarchus agreed early on that the good life consists of neither 
pleasure nor knowledge by themselves but the right mixture of the 
two (18E-22C). But the question of which should be the dominant 
element, knowledge or pleasure, is one that they do not consider 
to be answered in full even after lengthy discussion about each. 
The reason is that in order to make clear whether knowledge 
(including practical reasoning, i.e. phrones is ) or pleasure 
contributes more to the goodness of the good, mixed life "we must 
get a clear conception, or at least an outline (tvpon) of the
Good" (61A4-5). Whereas in the Republic such an outline was
provided by the Sun analogy, in the Philebus it is presented by 
considering three aspects of the Good: Truth, Measure or
Proportion, and Beauty. These three, when considered as one 
(i.e. the Good), are the cause of goodness in the mixed life
( 6 5 A1 - 5 ) .
Consider carefully how the Good is the cause of the mixture. 
Truth is said to enable the mixture--or anything else--to come
into being (64B2-3) as well as to become intelligible. As has 
been widely noted, ^  the use of truth ( ale the ia) here clearly 
means something other than just the correspondence of a
proposition to reality, or a type of cognition. After all, the 
forms of cognition or knowledge were already included in the good 
mixed life earlier in the dialogue (55C-59D); if that is all
truth means then nothing new would be added to the mixture. In 
fact, the presence of truth is necessary for the good mixture 
simply to exist, and in this sense is above knowledge. The same 
is true of the ontological dimension to the Sun Analogy of the
Renublie. The parallel between the sun's light and the Good's
truth extends beyond the visual model of knowledge. Socrates 
points out that just as the sun not only makes things visible but 
also provides for their generation, growth and nurture, so too 
the Good is responsible not only for the intelligibility of the 
Forms but also for their Being (509B). Although Plato does not 
explicitly say that the Good provides for Being via Truth, it is 
a reasonable inference to make using the sun as the analogue 
since clearly sunlight is responsible directly for the
generation, growth and nurture of sensibles. The Philebus is 
more explicit; it states that Truth is that part of the Good 
which enables the mixture to exist at all. If it weren't for 
Truth, there would be no knowledge and pleasure to mix together 
and form the good life. There would be no reality at all, at
either the universal or the human level.
Proportion, or Measure, is likewise essential for the
components of the good life to compose a mixture rather than a 
jumbled heap. In other words, Proportion brings unity. Beauty,
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although this is not said explicitly, presumably brings a certain 
type of order, the perfect order that something displays once it 
has fully realized its function or achieved its excellence 
(arete). This idea is implied by the connection between
Proportion on the one hand, and Beauty and Excellence, on the 
other (64E6-7). So all three--Truth, Proportion and Beauty-- 
taken together make the mixture good.
By considering separately each part of the Good--Beauty, 
Proportion and Truth--in relation to both pleasure and knowledge, 
Plato shows that knowledge is more akin to the highest Good than 
pleasure. As such, it is more honorable among humans and gods 
(65A-B). In the dialogue, Socrates reaches these conclusions by 
comparing pleasure as a class to the highest type of knowledge, 
namely, nous (i.e. intuitive reason) and phronesis (practical 
reasoning). [Henceforth I shall only refer to these two Greek 
terms since they are less clumsy than the English ones. Also, 
the significance of the lumping of these two terms together I 
shall consider at the end of this paper.] He says that nous is 
either truth itself or the most like it while pleasure is the 
greatest of impostors (65C). Likewise, nothing is more in
harmony with measure than mind while the opposite is true of
pleasure. Finally, phrones is and nous are never unseemly whereas 
the greatest pleasures are ridiculous or disgraceful (65E-66A). 
Consequently, in the final ranking of possessions for the good 
life, the 'eternal nature' (i.e. the Good)^ has chosen measure, 
the mean, fitness and all considered similar to these to be 
first. Second is proportion, beauty, completeness and
sufficiency, and all belonging to that kind. Third come nous and
phrones is . To fourth place belong the lower forms of knowledge,
technai (i.e. skills), and true opinions since they are more akin 
to pleasure than to the Good. In fifth and last place are the
painless and pure pleasures (66A-C).
This final ranking summarizes the previous discussion of the 
roles of pleasure and knowledge in the good life. An exploration 
of how Plato arrived at the ranking will provide a better 
understanding of his account of the Good. In general, the order 
of goods in the final ranking is determined by how we can best 
express the universal Good by realizing our proper place within 
the order of reality. This task requires an awareness of how our 
human needs for both pleasure and knowledge can be structured so 
as to reflect what is objectively good, i.e. what the "eternal 
nature" itself would choose. Earlier in the dialogue, Plato 
made it clear that limit and measure, as well as purity and
truth, should be used as criteria in distinguishing between
higher and lower pleasures and forms of cognition. To examine
how Plato used these criteria is thus important.
During the classification of pleasure, two basic kinds emerged. 
First are the mixed pleasures, so called because they are mixed 
with their opposite, pain. These pleasures are classified 
differently depending upon what aspects of them are being 
considered. In regard to their inherent capacity for extension 
in degree of intensity, magnitude and number, the mixed or impure
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pleasures belong to the indefinite class (52C-D). This aspect of 
the mixed pleasures is experienced when a pleasure originates 
from abnormal and/or inordinate desires, be they physical or 
psychological (44B-51A). The pleasures of the profligate, the 
homosexual prostitute, and the emotionally distressed would all 
fall into the indefinite category. ^  On the other hand, when 
limit is imposed on the mixed pleasures through intelligence, 
then they are considered members of the class where the 
indefinite is mixed with the definite (3lAff.) The limited 
aspect of these pleasures would be experienced in connection with 
health and strength^®.
The second main type of pleasure consists of the pure pleasures 
which are by their very nature limited. These include not only 
ones free from pain (e.g. the smell of a rose), but also those 
whose objects are relatively simple: the formal representations
involved in geometry, music, and art. These latter pleasures are 
considered to be 'divine' (51B-52C) because they are the closest 
link to the Forms the experience of pleasure can afford.
The key to the classification of pleasure is to compare the 
different varieties according to the criteria of limit, purity 
and truth. Those that are inherently unlimited are hopelessly 
impure, being mixed with their opposite, pain. These pleasures 
Socrates also considers to be false because their unlimitedness 
and indefiniteness inevitably lead to distortions of reality in 
one of three basic ways. In the first, the agent acts as if what 
is at best extrinsically valuable were intrinsically so, e.g. a 
miser who lives as if the acquisition of currency has value in 
itself. In the second, the agent exaggerates the pleasure of 
satisfaction, e.g., when someone breaks his diet and, in an 
attempt to rationalize what he knows is a poor choice, 
exaggerates his enjoyment while eating the forbidden sweets. 1 
In the third, what is really in itself neither pleasant nor 
painful is experienced as pleasant because one has just escaped 
from pain and this freedom seems pleasant by comparison to the 
pain just experienced. An example of this is the belief someone 
might have that she is experiencing pleasure because the dentist 
has stopped drilling. All these distortions have as their source 
the inherent indefiniteness of the pleasures involved. That is, 
the confused mixture of pleasure and pain in these situations 
will inevitably confuse the agent. By contrast, the pleasures 
that are intrinsically limited and pure are true, i.e. accurately 
reflect reality. Not surprisingly, in the final ranking the true 
and pure pleasures are admitted into the good life while the 
inherently indefinite pleasures are b a r r e d ^ . These latter are a 
hindrance to the pure pleasures and prevent the higher types of 
intelligence from coming about at all (63D-64A).
Although the fact that the pure and true pleasures are superior 
to the impure, mixed ones is obvious enough, exactly how truth 
and purity are related is not clear. Throughout most of the
classification of pleasure, Plato seems to have used the words 
"purity" and "truth" as more or less equivalent terms. But at 
one point (52D) Socrates asks whether pure or impure pleasures
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are more closely related to truth. To help explain what he means 
by "purity", he gives an example: unmixed white. Clearly, there
is a sense in which unmixed white is more white than that which 
is mixed with other colors. But Socrates goes on to conclude
that it is also the truest and most beautiful of all whiteness. 
Although he does not explain the relations between purity, truth, 
and beauty explicitly, he does say enough to convey the general 
point. Purity is valuable, even highly valuable, in its own 
right and not just as the absence of impurity, which in the case 
of pleasure means being mixed with pain. For something to be 
what it is and nothing else is to be a clear reflection of the 
definiteness of the basic structure of reality. Even in our 
experiences (pathe. 31B) of pleasure we may affirm our connection
with the beautiful and well-proportioned whole of reality of 
which we are a part. This is the significance of the pure 
pleasures, which are true because they unambiguously exemplify 
the definiteness, proportion, and beauty that underlie the 
surface of human life.
Purity is likewise used as a criterion in the classification of 
knowledge, for it is equated to exactness (57B) and related to 
truth (57D). These criteria first are used to rank different
kinds of skilled work according to the extent to which they
employ arithmetic, the science of measurement and weighing. 
Music (i.e. playing by ear), medicine, agriculture, piloting, and 
generalship are all examples of imprecise skills (technai). while 
building is more exact because it uses a good number of 
measurements and instruments (55E-56C) . Furthermore, within both 
arithmetic and the science of measurement are two distinct kinds: 
those of the many and those of the philosophers. Concerning
arithmetic, some reckon unequal units, e.g. two armies, while 
others insist on units that are all equal to one another. 
Likewise, calculation ( logis tike) and measuring used in building
and trade differ from the geometry of philosophers (56D-57A,
57D) . The ' philosophic'arithmetic and metrical arts surpass the 
more pedestrian varieties in purity, exactness and truth (57D) 
just as some pleasures are purer and truer than others (57B). The 
truest form of knowledge is the dialectic, defined as "...that 
knowledge which has to do with being and reality and that which 
is always the same (5 8A1-2). It is called called nous and 
phronesis. "the contemplation of true Being" (59D4-5)^^. So, the 
extent of truth or purity involved in the various forms of 
technai and knowledge depends upon the definiteness of their
respective objects.
Insofar as all forms of cognition are limited or definite to
some extent, all are included in the final ranking of the good
life. Many commentators have taken this as a signal that the
Philebus departs from the epistemology of the Republie in 
recognizing the technai as genuine forms of knowledge . ^  
However» a closer look at the two dialogues reveals that in both 
discussions the lower forms have a legitimate role in the good 
life provided that one first has the higher. In the Philebus. as 
we have seen, the distinction between philosophical and practical
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mathematics is based on the types of objects with which each type 
of mathematics deals, e.g. practical arithmetic is concerned with 
unequal units while the philosophical variety has as its objects 
only equal units. In the Republic. the distinction between 
practical and philosophical mathematics arises in the context of 
Socrates' search for a program of study which would be 
appropriate for the guardian-rulers who eventually will become 
philosophers but will be trained as warriors when young. Thus 
one criterion for the type of study required will be that it "not 
be useless to soldiers" (521D, 525B). Number and calculation is
then singled out as "the thing common to all crafts, thought, and 
forms of knowledge: (522C1-2) and as that which "every craft and
form of knowledge must necessarily participate in" (522C7-8), 
including the art of war (550C10-11). Similarly, geometry can be 
used for organizing battle formations, etc. (526D). But the most 
important use of both arithmetic and geometry is to turn the soul 
away from the sensible world towards truth and Being (521C, 525B,
525C, 526E, 527B) . This transition from a mere reckoner or
calculator of troops or battle formations to a reckoner of Being 
( 525B5-6) and contemplator of the Idea of the Good (526E1) is 
made possible by the study of pure numbers in which every unit is 
equal to every other (526A) and by geometry as the knowledge of 
what "always is being" (527B7-8).
As we have seen, the objects of philosophical mathematics are 
described in similar terms in the Philebus. Does this mean that 
these objects are meant to serve as a bridge to the realm of 
Being and the Good in the Philebus as in the Repub lie? The
Philebus indicates that this is so, though less explicitly than 
the Republie. The objects of divine knowledge, as well as those 
of divine pleasure, are clearly objects of a higher ontological 
status than those of the less pure types of pleasure and 
knowledge. The divine circle, sphere, etc. are at least closer 
than sensibles to true Being if not members of the realm of Being 
themselves.^  At any rate, the knowledge of divine mathematical 
objects, along with phrones is regarding Justice itself and nous. 
is considered to be more important than the lower forms of 
knowledge which are needed for the practical purposes of life, so 
that one may "find his way home" ( 6 2 B 7 - 8 ) . But such practical 
types are truly good only if one has divine knowledge (62B;D). 
The latter, called nous and phr one sis in the final ranking, is 
put into a separate class from the lower varieties of cognition. 
This fact underscores the point that the divine knowledge of the 
dialectic is significantly different from the lower types because 
it has as its explicit aim the discovery of ultimate reality.
Put differently, this last aspect of the ranking is important 
as an instance of where an appeal to the universal, and not just 
the human, Good is being made. Although recognition of the
crucial importance of limit in terms of obvious human goods such 
as health and excellence may be easy, the superiority of the 
dialectic to all other forms of cognition takes us beyond what we 
can value in strictly practical terms. The dialectic is superior 
in terms of both knowledge and value simply because Its objects
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are ontologically superior. At 58A-59C, a passage very
reminiscent of the Republic . the objects of the dialectic are 
contrasted to those of techne in terms of stability, purity and
truth. The former are, to use Gregory Vlastos' phrase,
"cognitively dependable", but are so, as I have argued
elsewhere^ because they, unlike sensibles, are real without 
qualification. The phrase, "true Being", also has evaluative
connotations that are grounded in the ontological sense of truth 
as what must be present for anything to be. Truth, as an aspect 
of the Good, enables everything to have whatever measure of
existence or Being it does. To appreciate fully the truth, then, 
one must accord to everything its proper value as an expression 
of a true understanding of reality, both distributively and 
collectively. The dialectic, which was earlier identified with 
the Divine Method (at 1.7A4·).,· makes this understanding possible by 
revealing the basic structure of the realm of true Being, which 
in turn explains the underlying order of the sensible world. In 
fact, the dialectic here, as in the Republic. ultimately leads to 
the Good. Let us now consider how this is so.
The Divine Method assumes that there is a one, a comprehensive 
unit or Form which ultimately unites the indefinite sensible 
phenomena under it via a definite number of parts or aspects. In 
the final pages of the Philebus. the Good, described earlier (at 
20D) as the most perfect or complete of all entities, appears as 
the ultimate one or unit. The point was also made earlier (at 
54CalO) that part (moira) of the Good is "that for the sake of 
which anything is generated", i.e., Being. In other words,
Becoming (what is generated) is for the sake of Being in the
sense that the latter is the end or good towards which the former 
moves. The suggestion here is that Being or the World of the
Forms is that part of the Good which serves as the final or 
teleological cause for the sensible world.^ Plato does not
explain this further but instead concentrates on those aspects of 
the Good which are particularly relevant to the question of the 
good life: Truth, Proportion and Beauty. This description of
the Good, then, is what we would expect given the Divine Method's 
recommendation to look for a one, then the many parts it has, 
identifying those aspects that are relevant to the subject in 
question, and classifying sensibles according to these aspects 
into general types. Individual sensible phenomena are recognized 
as being indefinite.
In terms of the good life, the types of pleasure and knowledge 
that are part of the mixture are those which admit of some 
measure or proportion and truth while those pleasures that are 
inherently indefinite are left out. Measure or limit, as well as 
purity and truth, are used to rank the various types of knowledge 
and pleasure. The highest types are called 'divine' because 
their objects belong, or are most akin, to the realm of true 
Being, which is part of the Good. So when pleasure and knowledge 
are compared in terms of the three aspects of the Good - - 
Proportion, Beauty and Truth--we should not be surprised that 
knowledge, in particular the highest type, is once again shown to
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be the more important element in the good life.
The fact that the highest type of knowledge is referred to as 
nous and phr one s is is also significant. Nous is related to 
noes is « the intuitive vision or grasp of the Forms in the Divided 
Line of the Repub 1ic. Although, as has been already noted, Plato 
is moving away from the visual/tactile model of knowledge in the 
Philebus , the term nous still might refer to a type of knowledge 
which, once realized, is self-evident. But what is of particular 
interest is the fact that nous is coupled with phr ones is . 
practical reasoning. The implication is that we must have both 
an intuitive awareness of the basic structure of reality and the 
ability to make use of this insight in our attempt to order human 
life. Thus we might say, according to the Philebus . that the 
philosophers would not be tempted to stay in a state of perpetual 
contemplation in order to enjoy the Good. For even physical 
pleasures, if experienced in the right way, bear the imprint of 
the divine.
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NOTES
1. The lone voice of dissent on the issue of the dating of the 
Philebus is that of Robin Waterfield who claims that it is a 
middle dialogue. He does so on doctrinal considerations, i.e. 
that since the Philebus makes an ontological dis tinetion between 
Being and Becoming, retains paradigmatic Forms, etc. it must be a 
middle dialogue. But this conclusion only follows if one already 
assumes that Plato went through a 'critical period' when he wrote 
the Parmenides and afterwards abandoned these elements of his 
earlier metaphysics. ( See his "The Place of the Philebus in 
Plato's Dialogues," Phrones is Vol. XXV, no.3, 1980, p p . 270-305.)
Given the fact that Waterfield fails to justify this assumption, 
he offers no reasons to reject the traditional late dating of the 
Philebus based upon the stylometric evidence provided by the 
diverse methods of Campbell, Lutoslawski, Ritter, and Brandwood. 
The Philebus was certainly written after the Parmenides and 
Plato's first trip to Syracuse (367 B.C.) and perhaps after the 
second visit in 361 B.C.
2 . Of course, there is a similar tension in Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics between the life of practical virtue and that 
of contemplation. What I shall demonstrate above is that in the 
Philebus. Plato reduces this tension considerably with his idea 
of the mixed life where types of pleasure and knowledge are 
ordered in such a way as to reflect, as much as possible, the 
structure of the Forms. Here he makes it clearer that although 
we live in the sensible world, we are called to live within it in 
a way that helps embody its ultimate source: the universal Good.
3. All I am suggesting here is that this reading of the passage
is plausible , not that it is true. In fact, I think that the
evidence weighs heavily against this reading. I heartily agree 
with, e.g., David Hitchcock when he claims that the Good in the
Republic is a Form (see 476A4-5, 505a2, 507B5- 7, 508E2-3, 517B8-
Cl, 534B9-C1), 'has' being (509D1), and can be known (see 508E4, 
517B8-C1,534B3-C5). In light of this, it is important to note 
the wav in which the Good is said to be beyond Being, i.e. in 
dignity and power. Similarly, the Good was said at 508E5-6 and 
509a4-5 to be more beautiful and more greatly to be honored than 
being and truth. (See David Hitchcock, "The Good in Plato's 
Republic " . Ape iron. vol. 19, Fall 1985, p. 90, n. 56.) It seems 
to me that the point here is that the Good is more valuable and 
powerful than anything else because it is the ultimate first
principle of reality, not because it is completely transcendent.
4. Julia Annas raises the point about Plato wanting to remove
conflicts of interests, fSee An Introduction to Plato's Republic. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), pp.104-5.] She does so in the
context of criticizing him from a contemporary liberal democratic 
standpoint which assumes the primacy of such values as the 
enhancement of individual autonomy. Whatever the merits of her
13
critique, I think that it is important to remember that Plato's
primary aim is the embodiment of unity. Although, of course, the
ancient Greeks were not generally concerned with individual 
autonomy, Plato is quite aware that his emphasis on unity may 
interfere with the happiness of the individual or at least with a 
particular class of society.
5. Annas cites this example, ibid.. p p . 93-94.
6. This lack of appreciation of the intrinsic value of
difference distinguishes Plato's ideal from other communitarians, 
including contemporary proponents such as Alasdair MacIntyre and 
Stanley Hauerwas. See, e.g., the former's After Virtue (Notre 
Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2nd ed. , 1984), and the
latter's A Community of Character____Towards a Constructive
Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press,
1981). MacIntyre's communitarianism is in the Aristotelian
tradition while Hauerwas' is based on his conception of the 
Christian church as a community called to the telling and the 
enactment of the gospel story.
7. No doubt there are other interpretations of Hinduism. I 
don't wish to push the parallel between Plato and Hinduism too 
far. But given the Eastern influence found in Plato's mythology 
of the soul, reincarnation, and punishment in the afterlife 
found, for example, in the myth of Er in the Republic . there is 
some ground for comparison.
8. This is G.M.A. Grube's translation, Plato's Republic
(Indianapolis: Hackett Press, 1974). All other translations are
mine from J. Burnet, Platonis Opera. 5 vols. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1900-1905.)
9. See Hitchcock, ibid. . p. 79. As evidence, he quotes 61IB10 -
612a5 about the true nature of the soul which would be revealed 
only if it escaped bodily taint and gave itself entirely to the 
longing for the divine. For only then "one would see ... whether 
it is many-formed or single - formed, or in what way it is and 
how” . Hitchcock interprets this passage as a hint that the soul 
is in fact "single and uniform, mono e ides (612a4). It is pure 
reason." Of course, it do^s not necessarily follow from the fact 
that the soul is said to be akin to the divine and the immortal 
that it is s ingle - formed. But the entire passage certainly is
ascetic in tone and this in itself is evidence of the 
contemplative model of the good life.
10. Ibid.. p. 82.
11. Throughout the Philebus. there are references to the divine,
including passages where he implies that the divine life which is 
free from pleasure and pain is the best one of all (22C5-D5; 32E-
33C; 55A; 65B). Thus the divine life is held up as an ideal that
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cwe are to approximate. It is unclear, however, whether this 
means that we should minimize or avoid all pleasures, or all 
those mixed with pain, or just those which are indeterminately 
mixed. I shall discuss these difficulties above, but some 
ambiguity still remains.
12/ See Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics. especially Aristotle's 
critique of the universal Platonic Good in Chapter 5.
13. The key passage is 15B1-8 where these serious puzzles 
(aporiai) are stated. The passage is rather ambiguously worded 
and thus much controversy surrounds how to interpret the puzzles 
and even how many (two or three?) of them there are. For a brief 
overview of the controversy, see R. M. Dancy, "The One, The Many, 
and the Forms: Philebus 15B1-8,", Ancient Philosophy. vol.4, 
1984. Fortunately, for the purposes of this paper, this issue 
need not be explored.
I also think that the units (which Plato calls "monads") 
are Forms which are ontologically prior to their sensible
instances but to argue for this would go beyond the scope of this 
paper.
14. Waterfield notes that the Greek classification was based on
how much breath it took to sound a particular letter; vowels took 
the most, mutes (our 'stops') took the least, with the semi­
vowels (our nasals, sibilants and continuants) in-between. See 
Waterfield, Plato Ph i1ebus. (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England
and New York: Penguin Books Ltd, 1982,) p.63, n. 2. Perhaps
Plato sees the letters, as well as musical notes, forming a 
continuum. When making the same division of letters in the
Cratvlus. Plato does draw a parallel between this division and 
the one of musical sound into rhythms (see 423E-425A; cited by 
Waterfield, ibid.) For our present purposes, the details of this
account need not be determined.
15. The fact that the visual/tactile model is used throughout
the middle dialogues iä noted by Henry Teloh, The Development of 
Plato's Metaphysics. (University Park and London: The
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1981) p p . 100-118.
16. A. E. Taylor and Paul Shorey believe that Plato is 
condemning the fact that the one and the many are features in our 
thought and language. [See Taylor, Plato Philebus and Epinomis.
R. Klinbansky, G. Calogero, and A. C. Lloyds, eds . , (London: 
Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1956), p.109, and Shorey, "Recent
Platonism in England", American Journal of Philology, vol. IX, 
1888, pp . 281-283.] But all Socrates actually condemns at 15D-
16B is the way the young (and philosophically immature) misuse 
this fact.
17. I agree with Bury and Hackforth in emphasizing the close tie 
between truth and reality or Being. See R.G. Bury, The Philebus
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of Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897), Appendix
F. , pp . 201ff. ; and R. Hackforth, Platof s Examination of
Pleasure. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1954), p. 133. For
a different view, see J.C.B. Gosling, Plato Philebus. (Oxford: 
The Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 134-135; pp. 212 seq.
18. The personification of the Good occurs elsewhere in the
Philebus. notably in the discussion of the Cause at 26E-31A where 
it is depicted as the creator of all (30E1-2), including the 
mixed kind (26E-27C). As I have argued elsewhere, there is no 
need to take the talk of the Cause's generation and production 
literally. (See Cynthia Hampton, "Plato's Late Ontology: A
Riddle Unresolved", Anclent Philosophy. vol. VIII, no. 1, Spring
1988, p.110-111; 115, n.16.) Here I would like to add that one
reason Plato might have in using such language and for
personifying the Good as a creator is to give us a representation 
of the Good which makes it clearer to us how we can model our own 
activities in imitation of the Forms. For if we think of the
Good itself as the producer and governor of the cosmic order 
according to nous. phronesi s . and sophia. then we can better 
grasp the fact that the exercise of our own versions of these 
intellectual faculties is crucial in bringing about and 
maintaining order in the human sphere. (A similar reason might 
also help to explain the use of the demiurge in Republic Book X 
and in the Timaeus . ) The significance of coupling nous w ith 
phrones is in describing the mental powers we are to employ I 
shall discuss above.
19. Unfortunately, Plato is not terribly forthcoming with clear
examples of abnormal and inordinate pleasures. One example he 
gives is the pleasure an invalid experiences when scratching an 
itch caused by a disease (44B-46B). He also alludes to a sexual 
experience at 46D-47A but does not indicate whether the pleasures 
here are abnormal, inordinate, or both. The example of the 
passive homosexual (the kinaidos) whose passivity may include 
'being kept' or even being a prostitute, and whose life is 
compared to one of perpetual scratching, I have borrowed from 
Gorgias 494E. The life of such a one is clearly thought by Plato 
to be disgraceful, and perhaps abnormal. As examples of
pleasures that arise from psychic abnormalities and/or excesses 
he refers to those involving anger, fear, yearning, mourning, 
love, jealousy, envy, etc. (46B-48B) . The only emotions he 
actually analyzes here are those aroused by comedy: the mixture
of the pain of malice with the pleasure of laughing at the 
misfortunes of others (48B-50E). But discussion of this
complicated case would take us too far afield from our present 
purpose.
20. Somewhat confusingly, Plato refers to both the pleasures 
that are mixed with pain, and those which are limited by 
intelligence, as being mixed, measured, or limited. But I take 
the mixture with pain to be the broader category, including both
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the inherently indefinite pleasures and those limited by 
intelligence. For the pleasures limited by intelligence still 
include pain, e.g. the pleasures of health involve the 
restoration of bodily imbalances.
21. For more on these two types of false pleasure, see Cynthia
Hampton, "Pleasure, Truth and Being in Plato's Philebus: A Reply
to Professor Frede", Phronesis Vol. XXXII, no. 2, 1987, p p . 253 -
262.
22. There remains the problem of where the pleasures which are
limited by intelligence (i.e. the necessary pleasures attending 
health, strength etc.) are supposed to fit in the final ranking. 
Taylor and Hackforth speculate that the reference to a sixth 
class at 66C-D is meant to encompass the necessary pleasures 
while Gosling explains the omission by pointing out that the 
prize-giving is not between all elements of the good life but 
only those which contribute to its goodness. See Taylor, 
op. ci t . . p. 91; Hackforth, op. ci t . . p. 139; p.140, n. 3; and 
Gosling, op .cit. . p. 224. Perhaps Taylor and Hackforth are right 
but it is still puzzling why there is no explicit reference to 
what comprises the sixth class. I find Gosling's suggestion 
unsatisfactory because the necessary pleasures include those 
which promote fitness, health and virtue (62E-63A, 63E), and
these elements, (especially virtue), surely contribute to the 
goodness of the mixed life.
23. As Hackforth notes ( op. c i t . . p. 124, n.l), Plato does not
always restrict the meaning of the terms nous. phronesis and 
episteme. But the context strongly suggests that the first two
terms refer to a specially elevated form of knowledge. The 
reference to 'contemplation' simply means knowledge of the Forms 
which includes intuiting them (i.e. nous). but also involves 
knowing how to embody them in our lives (i.e. phrones is). We 
shall discuss this more above.
Concerning the use of the term ' ep i s t erne ' , it is used in the 
Philebus in a general sense as something roughly equivalent to 
'cognition', the term I use above. In this general sense, it is 
sometimes used in conjunction with techne. Roger Shiner in his 
monograph, Knowledge and Reality in Plato's Philebus. (Assen: 
Koninklijke Van Gorcum &/Comp. B.V., 1974), p.55, points to the
interchangability of the terms episteme and techne as evidence of 
the radical shift in the Philebus from the epistemology in the 
Republic. But as Richard Mohr has pointed out [in "Philebus 55C- 
62A and Revisionism", New Essays on Plato, ed. Francis Jeffry 
Pelletier and John King-Farlow, (Guelph: Canadian Association
for Publishing in Philosophy, The University of Calgary Press, 
1983), p. 166] Plato does not consistently use technical language 
even in the Repub1ic. Note Republic 533B1-6 where the dialectic 
is called a techne. In response to Mohr, Shiner claims (in 
"Knowledge in Philebus 55C-62A; A Response", New Essays on Plato,
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rp·. 172) that the language in the Re pub lie suggests that the 
dialectic is the only way to knowledge whereas the Philebus does 
not. But as I argue above, it is true that in both dialogues, 
the dialectic is the highest form of cognition and hence 
knowledge in the full or true sense, and the lower forms, 
i ncludí ng techne. p r esuppose it. For more ο n S h i ne r ' s p osition 
and my responses to it, see n. 24 below.
24. Commentators who argue that such a radical shift between the 
epistemologies of the Repub1ic ^nd the Phileb us has taken place 
include Roger Shiner and Henry Telöh. Besides the points
mentioned in n.lO above, Shiner also cites as evidence: 1) the
absence of the contrast in the Philebus between the visible and 
the intelligible, 2) the absence of a 'definitional association' 
of the dialectic with being able to 'give an account' in the 
Philebus as compared to the Republic (e.g . 531D9-E5), and 3) the
fact that in the Philebus. the dialectic and techne are 
distinguished only in terms of purity, accuracy and clarity, i.e. 
in terms of degree rather than in kind. (See Shiner. on . cit. . 
pp . 56-57;61-66.) Henry Teloh makes a similar point when he says
that in the Philebus. the Divine or the Collection and Division 
Method can be applied by everyone, cobblers as well as 
philosophers. But in the Repub1ic only the philosophers can know 
the Forms and it is this knowledge , combined with erotic desire 
for the truth, that distinguishes them from the warriors and 
artisans. So the dialectic is the only form of knowledge, not 
just the highest. See Teloh, op.cit . . p .181 .
My response is as follows: 1) If, as we have said (see n. 10),
the use of terminology is inconclusive then so is the absence of 
any particular phrase. Instead of isolating certain words from 
the context, the similarities and differences between the 
Republic and Philebus must be judged according to the overall 
point and tone of their respective discussions on the subject of 
knowledge and methodology. As I argue above, on these grounds it 
seems that the Philebus can be seen as an ex tens ion of the 
discussion of the Republic at least in terms of the good life.
2) Shiner seems to forget that the dialectic is associated with
the Divine Method which is based on the assumption that there is 
a 'one'. As I argue above, the ultimate 'one' turns out to be 
the Good. This idea is not f ar f rom the description of the
dialectic in the Republic which involves the descent from the 
unhy p o t h e t i c a1 first principle of the Good (533C) .
3) As I argue above, the distinction between techne and the 
dialectic is grounded on the ontological status of their 
respective objects so to speak of differences in degree only is 
misleading since the objects of higher ontological status 
actually belong to a different category of reality than those of 
a lower status. This point comes out clearly in the final 
ranking where the dialectic is s ing1è d out and placed in a 
separate and higher class than the other forms of cognition.
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It is also worth remembering that in the Republic. the
dialectic, as the study of the Good, is the only road to
knowledge (533C) but this does not mean that it will be the only
form of knowledge once that road is taken up to the Good and then 
back down the Divided Line. Once grounded in the Good as the
unhypothesized first principle, mathematics could become genuine 
knowledge.
25. Of course, the ontological status of the mathematical
realities is not left obscure in the Philebus alone; there is
considerable controversy surrounding those entities that 
correspond to diano ia on the Divided Line as well. Are these 
Forms or the 'intermediate mathematical objects' Aristotle says
were a part of Plato's ontology (e.g. at Me taphvs ics 987B15)? It 
goes beyond the scope of this paper to engage in this discussion. 
My only point here is that whatever the exact ontological status 
of the mathematical entities, it is clear in the Republic that 
the study of them is to lead the aspiring philosophers to
contemplation of Justice itself, etc. and there is reason to 
believe that a similar point is being made in the Philebus as I 
suggest above.
26. See Hampton, op.cit . . pp.256 - 57.
27. The "for the sake of" relation is illustrated at 53D and
54C-D with the following: brave lovers for the sake of beloved
boys, shipbuilding for ships, and drugs for health. It is fairly 
clear that the beloved boys, ships, and health function as the 
raison d'etre for the activities of acting bravely, shipbuilding, 
and taking (or prescribing) drugs respectively. Cf. Nicomachean 
Ethics 1152B12-15 where Aristotle says that Plato believed the 
end to be superior to the process of reaching it. Plato's 
immediate point in this passage of the Philebus is to argue that 
pleasure cannot be the good since it is always becoming, but he 
does so by appealing to the general inferiority of Becoming to 
Being. I think that ultimately the ontological implications of 
this passage should be seen in terms of the causality of the 
Good. The Good is the direct cause of the order of the World of 
the Forms which in turn serves as the teleological cause of the 
sensible world. But to prove this point would take us beyond our 
present discussion.
1 .
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